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Introduction
It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong
man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The
credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred
by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who err, who comes
short again and again because there is no effort without error and shortcom-
ing; but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great enthusi-
asms, the great devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the
best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the
worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall
never be with those cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor
defeat.
President Theodore Roosevelt1
t Clinical Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. Previously served as an
Associate Professor, Department of Law, United States Military Academy at West Point
and as the Senior Advisor to the Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, United
States Department of State. The author may be reached at mike.newton@vanderbilt.
edu. The opinions, and conclusions of this paper, as well as its faults, are solely those of
the author.
1. President Theodore Roosevelt, The Man in the Arena: Citizenship in a Republic,
Address at the Sorbonne, Paris (Apr. 23, 1910), available at http://theodoreroosevelt.
org/research/speeches.htm.
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The people of Iraq have a legal and moral right to build a structure for
the prosecution of the leading figures in the Ba'athist regime. More to the
point, the judges who have risked their lives to build the rule of law in Iraq
should rightfully expect the support and encouragement of the world
rather than a cautious and lukewarm assurance that the civilized peoples
of the world wish them the best. I was involved in the conceptual develop-
ment and drafting of the Statute for the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST), and
have subsequently spent many hours with the judges and investigators of
the court as they prepare to undertake their important work. I have gained
a deep respect for the legal ethos and professional courage of the members
of the Iraqi bar who have risked their lives and those of their families to
serve the Iraqi people. My experience has convinced me that the creation
of the IST is not only warranted under the existing structure of interna-
tional law, but accords with the highest aspirations of those who purport to
believe in the rule of law.
The creation of the IST was borne of necessity after the fall of Saddam
Hussein's regime. The exercise of punitive criminal accountability pursu-
ant to domestic laws is at the heart of our understanding of what it means
to have a society built on the rule of law, which in turn makes it the sine
qua non of true sovereignty. This principle is so essential that the pursuit
of justice often becomes a focal point for the military forces deployed to a
society where the legislative and judicial systems have become corrupted,
replaced, or have simply collapsed under the weight of tyranny. 2 Assuming
its proper role on behalf of the Iraqi people, the Interim Iraqi Governing
Council (the "Governing Council") made the creation of an accountability
mechanism for punishing those responsible for the atrocities of the
Ba'athist regime one of its earliest priorities. 3 After an extensive and genu-
ine partnership that entailed months of debate, drafting, and consideration
of expert advice solicited from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA),
the Governing Council issued the IST Statute on December 10, 2003. 4 The
announcement of the Statute culminated a developmental process carried
out under the auspices of the Legal Affairs subcommittee of the Iraqi Gov-
erning Council led by Judge Dara, and by sheer coincidence preceded the
capture of Saddam Hussein by only four days.
Ancillary to the announcement of the Statute, the Governing Council
and CPA requested that the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies
(DIILS) 5 present a seminar on investigating and prosecuting international
2. See Michael A. Newton, Harmony or Hegemony? The American Military Role in the
Pursuit of Justice, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L., 231 (2004).
3. Interview with David Hodgkinson, Office of Human Rights and Transitional Jus-
tice, Coalition Provisional Authority, in Baghdad, Iraq (Dec. 11, 2003).
4. Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art. 38, Dec. 10, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 231, availa-
ble at http://iraq-ist.org/en/about/statute.htm [hereinafter IST Statute].
5. See Defense Institute of International Legal Studies Mission, http://www.dsca.
mil/diils/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2005). The Defense Institute of International Legal
Studies (DIILS) provides education teams to address over 330 legal topics, with a focus
on justice systems, the rule of law, and the execution of disciplined military operations.
Since its inception in 1992, DIILS officers have presented programs tailored to the needs
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crimes in accordance with international norms. The diverse group of
ninety-six Iraqi judges, prosecutors, and lawyers who gathered in Baghdad
were among the first Iraqis outside the Governing Council to review the
Statute. Members of this group repeatedly and enthusiastically referred to
Saddam's regime as the "entombed regime." The members of the Iraqi legal
community that we were teaching later formed the pool of Iraqis who were
initially considered for various positions inside the IST. I was in the room
with those Iraqi judges and prosecutors in Baghdad when they learned of
the successful capture of President Hussein. In the frenzy of joy and palpa-
ble relief that followed the electric news,6 one of the judges hugged me and
exclaimed "Today is day one!" His spontaneous vision captured the sense
of many Iraqis that the definitive end of the Hussein regime was a water-
shed event for those dedicated to leading Iraq towards stability and sover-
eignty founded on respect for human rights and the rule of law. In
addition, judges have reiterated to me on a number of occasions that they
view their important work as the doorway that will expand the influence
and application of international humanitarian law across the Arab-speak-
ing areas of the world.
The dedication of the Iraqi legal professionals to restore the rule of law
reflects the broader societal thirst for accountability that is a foreseeable
feature of a post-conflict civil society emerging from widespread and offi-
cial governmental human rights abuses. 7 As a microcosm of Iraqi society,
the overwhelming majority of that original group of 96 legal professionals
had suffered the loss of immediate family members to the criminal acts of
the regime. One judge was the only survivor of seven brothers. The elation
of the Iraqi people mirrored that of other societies where the civilian popu-
lation prized justice and an end to repression in the immediate aftermath
of operations even in areas where the citizens suffer from extreme poverty
of the host country to over 23,000 senior military and civilian government officials in 95
nations around the world. Seminars are designed for audiences of 40 to 60 military and
civilian executive personnel from the host country, and take place both in the host
nation and in the United States.
6. The members of the joint team of military lawyers knew of the apprehension just
prior to the receipt of the news by the judges. A cell phone rang, and one of the judges
sprang to his feet and interrupted the ongoing class. He shouted the news, and the
entire class disintegrated for the day. The celebratory fire of AK-47s punctuated the
Iraqi afternoon and lasted most of the night. The classroom celebration was long and
joyous as normally reserved older gentlemen danced and hugged and cried with relief at
the news. For a description of the broader mood of the Iraqi people, see Anne Barnard
& Michael Kranish, Baghdad Falls: Euphoric Iraqis Topple Symbols; US Warns That War
Not Over, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 10, 2003, at Al.
7. Nongovernmental organizations and the U.S. Department of State have cata-
logued a panoply of human rights abuses under Saddam's rule in Iraq, inter alia, the
deaths of 50,000 to 100,000, Kurds; the destruction of 2,000 Kurdish villages; the inter-
nal displacement of 900,000 Iraqi civilians; summary executions of over 10,000 political
opponents; beheadings; prostitution; and the intentional deprivation of food to the civil-
ian population. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Past Repression and
Atrocities by Saddam Hussein's Regime (Apr. 4, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
infocus/iraq/news/20030404-1.html.
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and overwhelming material needs. 8 The demise of the regime fanned the
long-subdued embers of hope that the citizenry had never quite forgotten;
people began to openly discuss the dim but potent aspiration that they
might be able to live in peace and stability secure in the knowledge that the
rule of law would protect their home and family. The priority that the
common people attach to the restoration of true justice perhaps reflected
an inchoate realization that the freedom from oppression achieved by coali-
tion forces could not be sustained without effective restoration of personal
accountability based on law. The elation that Iraqi citizens expressed as
the statues of Saddam Hussein fell in Baghdad testified to their deep desire
for the restoration of a society built on the rule of law rather than one
dominated by the whims of a dictator supported by the machinery of
bureaucratic oppression.
The IST was created with the express goal of bringing personal
accountability to those Ba'athists that were responsible for depriving Iraqis
of their human rights, and of virtually extinguishing the real rule of law for
over two decades.9 It would be ironic indeed if the mechanism created by
the Iraqis to address the human rights failings of the past in itself became
the vehicle for denying and suppressing human rights into the future. The
purpose of this paper is to assess the creation and implementation of the
IST in light of relevant human rights norms. From my perspective, the men
and women who have committed themselves to serve the IST are the ones
who have shouldered the burden of replacing the osmosis of fear that per-
vaded Iraq under Saddam's rule with the peace and societal stability that
flows from a solid rule of law.
It is false to presume that the tribunal will be capable of achieving only
the shadow of justice through the vehicle of undermining the core human
rights of those who will face charges under its authority. Such an assump-
tion is unwarranted as demonstrated by a closer examination of the struc-
ture of the statute and its accompanying rules of evidence and procedure.
In particular, the interface of the IST Statute with the preexisting structure
of the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure reveals a developed web of legal
protections that fully accord with existing human rights principles. This
8. See, e.g., Georges Anglade, Rules, Risks, and Rifts in the Transition to Democracy in
Haiti, 20 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1176, 1190 (1997) ("In the presence of an inhuman specta-
cle of misery and its urgent material needs, one tends to forget that the primary needs of
people are liberty, justice, and security. Because a pauper also needs justice, the object
of a transition to democracy becomes the modern organization of justice in a State of
law. This demands destruction of the old military-police apparatus in order to give birth
to another organization in charge of public order. It also requires that the institutions of
justice and the body of functionaries that make them work be reconsidered so as to
produce a 'just justice' and in order to guarantee a 'free freedom.' Haiti must reconstruct
judicial power separate from the executive power, which too often has controlled judicial
power. Justice by law is thus the initial goal in the transition to democracy as well as the
object of the transition itself. It is essentially through the achievement of this goal that
Haiti can unite a country broken in two, and create a single people from two profoundly
antagonistic factions. Economic analysis also poses justice as a preliminary condition
necessary to development.").
9. See IST Statute, supra note 4, art. 1.
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paper will discuss the basis under international law that warranted the
formation of the IST and describe the salient features of the tribunal's
structure. After noting some of the most important points of comparison
between the IST and earlier accountability mechanisms, the paper will con-
clude with a detailed explication of the relationship between the tribunal
and the most important of the existing human rights norms related to the
process of criminal accountability for crimes derived from international
law.
1. Legal Authorities for the Creation of the Iraqi Special Tribunal
A. The Law of Occupation
The relationship of a subjugated civilian population to the foreign
power temporarily exercising de facto sovereignty is regulated by the exten-
sive development of the law of occupation. 10 As a matter of legal rights
and duties, "[tlerritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed
under the authority of the hostile army."' "I This legal test is met when the
following circumstances prevail on the ground: First, that the existing gov-
ernmental structures have been rendered incapable of exercising their nor-
mal authority; and second, that the occupying power is in a position to
carry out the normal functions of government over the affected area. 12 For
the purposes of United States policy, occupation is the legal state occa-
sioned by "invasion plus taking firm possession of enemy territory for the
purpose of holding it.'1 3 Although a state of occupation does not "affect
the legal status of the territory in question,"'14 the assumption of authority
over the occupied territory implicitly means that the existing institutions of
society have been swept aside.
10. See generally Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land arts. 42-56,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910), reprinted in DOCUMENTA-
TION ON THE LAWS OF WAR 73 (3d ed., Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 2000)
[hereinafter 1907 Hague Regulations]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 47-78, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.
287 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
11. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 42. See also DEPARTMENT OF THE
ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, c 351 (1956) [hereinafter FM
27-10] (devoting the whole of Chapter 6 of the United States Army Field Manual related
to the law of armed conflict to explicating the text of the law related to occupation as
well as the United States policy related to occupation), available at http://www.global
security.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/27-10/.
12. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAw OF ARMED CONFLICT 275, '1
11.3 (2004).
13. FM 27-10, supra note 11, 1 352.
14. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims Of International Armed Conflicts, Annex 1, art. 4, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol I]. The
United States policy in this regard is clear that occupation confers only the "means of
exercising control for the period of occupation. It does not transfer the sovereignty to
the occupant, but simply the authority or power to exercise some of the rights of sover-
eignty." FM 27-10, supra note 11, c 358.
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Because the foreign power has displaced the normal domestic offices,
the cornerstone of the law of occupation is the broad obligation that the
foreign power "take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as
far as possible, public order and safety .... 15 In the authoritative French,
the occupier must preserve "l'ordre et la vie publics" (i.e. "public order and
life").1 6 On that legal reasoning alone, the establishment of the IST could
have been warranted under the inherent occupation authority of the Coali-
tion as an integral part of the strategic plan for restoring public calm and
peaceful stability to the civilian population across Iraq. From that perspec-
tive, the IST is the intellectual twin to the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) because the United Nations Security
Council established the ICTY with a groundbreaking 1993 resolution 17
that was premised on the legal obligation of the Security Council to "main-
tain or restore international peace and security."'1 8
The IST and ICTY 19 are both founded on the assessment by the offi-
cials charged with preserving stability and the rule of law that prosecution
of selected persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law will facilitate the restoration of societal peace and stabil-
ity (l'ordre et la vie publics in the language of the Hague Regulations). After
the first defendant, a Serb named Dusko Tadit, challenged the legality of
the ICTY, the Trial Chamber ruled that the authority of the Security Coun-
cil to create the tribunal was dispositive. 20 Just as the Security Council has
the "primary responsibility" for maintaining international peace and secur-
15. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 42 (emphasis added).
16. Id. The conceptual limitations of foreign occupation also warranted a temporal
limitation built into the 1949 Geneva Conventions that the general "application of the
present Convention [law of occupation] shall cease one year after the general close of
military operations ...." Id. art. 6. Based on pure pragmatism, Article 6 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention does permit the application of a broader range of specific treaty
provisions "for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises
the functions of government in such territory ...." Id. The 1977 Protocols eliminated
the patchwork approach to treaty protections with the simple declarative that "the appli-
cation of the Conventions and of this Protocol shall cease, in the territory of the Parties
to the conflict, on the general close of.military operations and, in the case of occupied
territories, on the termination of the occupation . Protocol I, supra note 14, art.
3(b).
17. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
18. U.N. Charter art. 39 (giving the Security Council the power to "determine the
existence of any threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and it "shall
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with
Article[ ] 41 ... to maintain or restore international peace and security").
19. See also infra note 126 and accompanying text for a similar conclusion in rela-
tion to the creation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone on the basis of an agreement
between the Security Council and the government of Sierra Leone.
20. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion on Juris-
diction (Aug. 10, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/
100895.htm ("[Tlhis International Tribunal is not a constitutional court set up to scru-
tinise the actions of organs of the United Nations. It is, on the contrary, a criminal
tribunal with clearly defined powers, involving a quite specific and limited criminal
jurisdiction. If it is to confine its adjudications to those specific limits, it will have no
authority to investigate the legality of its creation by the Security Council.").
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ity under the United Nations Charter,2 1 the law of occupation imposed a
concrete legal duty on the CPA to facilitate the return of stability and order
to Iraq after the fall of the regime. As criminal forums conceived and cre-
ated pursuant to the broader responsibility of empowered authorities to
maintain or restore peace and security, both the ICTY and IST were appro-
priate nonmilitary mechanisms (though each was creative in its own time
and in different ways). 22
In the context of Iraq, of course, the legal framework of occupation
rests on a delicate balance. On the one hand, the civilian population has
no legal right to conduct activities that are harmful to persons or property
of the occupying force, and may be convicted or interned based on such
unlawful activities. 23 Article 42 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (hereinafter referred to
by its more common appellation the "Fourth Geneva Convention") specifi-
cally permits the deprivation of liberty for civilians if "the security of the
Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary."2 4 Even large-scale intern-
ment may be permissible in situations where there are "serious and legiti-
mate reasons" to believe that the detained persons threaten the safety and
security of the occupying power. 25 At the same time, the coercive authority
of the occupying power is limited by a specific prohibition against making
any changes to the governmental structure or institutions that would
undermine the benefits guaranteed to civilians under the Geneva Conven-
tions.2 6 Thus, the baseline principle of occupation law is that the civilian
population should continue to live their lives as normally as possible.
This baseline principle rests on the reality that mere occupation does
not effect a transfer of sovereignty; hence, the occupying power must pro-
tect the lives and property of the civilian population from the uncertainties
inherent in the transfer of political authority to the maximum practicable
extent. This concept may be termed the minimalist principle, though some
observers have termed it the principle of normality. 27 As a policy priority
flowing from the mandates of the Fourth Geneva Convention, domestic law
should be enforced by domestic officials insofar as possible, and crimes
not of a military nature that do not affect the occupant's security will nor-
mally be delegated to the jurisdiction of local courts. 28 The IST fits this
legal/policy model precisely as it was created and subsequently ratified by
Iraqi authorities as an Iraqi domestic statute.
21. U.N. Charter art. 24(1).
22. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
23. Geneva IV, supra note 10, arts. 68, 78 (permitting detention of civilians for
"imperative reasons of security").
24. Id. art. 42.
25. See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment (Feb. 20, 2001), availa-
ble at http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/appeal/udgement/celajO10220.pdf (last visited
June 26, 2005).
26. Geneva IV, supra note 10, art. 47.
27. SeeJEAN S. PICTET, PRINCIPLES DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAIRE [PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw] 50 (1966).
28. FM 27-10, supra note 11, 1 370.
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However, the international legal regime does not doggedly elevate the
provisions of domestic law and the structure of domestic institutions above
the pursuit of justice. Despite the minimalist principle, international law
allows reasonable latitude for an occupying power to modify, suspend, or
replace the existing penal structure in the interests of ensuring justice and
the restoration of the rule of law. In its temporary exercise of functional
sovereignty over the occupied territory, and as a pragmatic necessity, the
occupation authority must ensure the proper functioning, inter alia, of
domestic criminal processes and cannot abdicate that responsibility to
domestic officials of the civilian population who may or may not be willing
or able to carry out their normal functions in pursuit of public order. 29
Pursuant to the baseline principle of normality, Article 43 of the 1907
Hague Regulations mandates that the occupying power must respect,
"unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."30
The duty found in Article 43 of the Hague Regulations to respect local
laws unless "absolutely prevented" (in French "empechement absolu")
imposes a seemingly categorical imperative.3 1 However, rather than being
understood literally, empechement absolu has been interpreted as the
equivalent of "necessite."3 2 In the post World War 1I context, this meant
that the Allies could set the feet of the defeated Axis powers "on a more
wholesome path"33 rather than blindly enforcing the institutional and legal
constraints that had been the main bulwarks of tyranny.
34
Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention explained the implica-
tions of older 1907 Hague Article 43 language by explaining the exception
to the minimalist principle in more concrete terms. In ascertaining the
implications of the 1949 Article 64 language with regard to 2003 the occu-
29. Geneva IV, supra note 10, art. 54 ("ITIhe Occupying Power may not alter the
status of public officials or judges, or in any way apply sanctions to or take measures of
coercion or discrimination against them should they abstain from fulfilling their func-
tions for reasons of conscience.").
30. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 10, art. 43.
31. Id.
32. Yoram Dinstein, Legislation Under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations: Belligerent
Occupation and Peacebuilding, I PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT
RESEARCH HARVARD UNIVERSITY OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 8 (Fall 2004). See also E.H.
Schwenk, Legislative Powers of the Military Occupant Under Article 43, Hague Regulations,
54 YALE L.J. 393 (1945).
33. MoIs GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 223-27 (1959).
34. For example, German forces were able to commit almost unthinkable brutalities
under the shield of Nazi sovereignty based on the Fuehrerprinzip (leadership principle)
imposed by Hitler to exercise his will as supreme through the police, the courts, the
military, and all the other institutions of organized German society. The oath of the
Nazi party stated: "I owe inviolable fidelity to Adolf Hitler; I vow absolute obedience to
him and to the leaders he designates for me." DREXEL A. SPRECHER, INSIDE THE NUREM-
BERG TRIAL: A PROSECUTOR'S COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT 1037-38 (1999). Accordingly,
power resided in Hitler, from whom subordinates derived absolute authority in hierar-
chical order. This absolute and unconditional obedience to the superior in all areas of
public and private life led, in Justice Jackson's famous words, to "a National Socialist
despotism equalled [sic] only by the dynasties of the ancient East." Robert Jackson,
Opening Statement to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, in II TRIAL OF THE
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 99-100 (1947).
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pation in Iraq, it is important to realize its drafters did not extend the
"traditional scope of occupation legislation. '3 5 Hence, the law of the
Geneva Convention amplified the concept of necessity understood at the
time to be embedded in the old Hague Article 43. Article 64 incorporates
the preexisting baseline of normality within the confines of protecting the
legal rights of the civilian population. Article 64 accordingly reads as
follows:
The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the
exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power
in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the
application of the present Convention. Subject to the latter consideration
and to the necessity for ensuring the effective administration of justice, the
tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue to function in respect of all
offences covered by the said laws.
The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of the occu-
pied territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying
Power to fulfil its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain the
orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occu-
pying Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces or admin-
istration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication
used by them.3 6
The plain language of Article 64 must be interpreted in good faith in
light of the object and purpose of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 3 7 which
seeks to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population and ameliorate the
potentially adverse consequences of occupation subsequent to military
defeat. The first paragraph balances both the minimalist intent of the fram-
ers with the overriding purpose of balancing the concurrent rights of both
the civilian population and the right of the occupier to maintain the secur-
ity of its forces and property. The second paragraph of Article 64 morphed
the implicit meaning of "necessary" drawn from the old Hague Article 43
into an explicit authority to amend the domestic laws to achieve the core
purposes of the Convention. Article 64 has thus been accepted and imple-
mented by states in light of the common sense reading and the underlying
legal duties of the occupier to permit modification of domestic law under
limited circumstances. 3 8
35. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 194 (1968).
36. Geneva IV, supra note 10, art. 64.
37. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. (1969) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
38. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 293,
11.56 (2004). See also FM 27-10, supra note 11, '1 371 ("Nature of Laws Suspended or
Repealed. The occupant may alter, repeal, or suspend laws of the following types:
a. Legislation constituting a threat to its security, such as laws relating to
recruitment and the bearing of arms.
b. Legislation dealing with political process, such as laws regarding the rights of
suffrage and of assembly.
c. Legislation the enforcement of which would be inconsistent with the duties of
the occupant, such as laws establishing racial discrimination.").
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B. Legal Authority for the Promulgation of the IST
The touchstone of analysis for the promulgation of the IST is to recog-
nize that the CPA mission statement gave it affirmative authority as the
"temporary governing body designated by the United Nations as the lawful
government of Iraq until such time as Iraq is politically and socially stable
enough to assume its sovereignty."' 39 On one level, the revalidation by Iraqi
authorities of the IST after the return of full Iraqi sovereignty makes an
analysis of IST formation under the umbrella authority of the CPA a moot
point. At the same time, the IST as it exists today is cloaked in a seamless
garment of legality both in terms of its origination and in its ongoing exis-
tence as a distinct branch of Iraqi bureaucracy. The CPA posited its power
as the occupation authority in Iraq in declarative terms: "The CPA is vested
with all executive, legislative, and judicial authority necessary to achieve its
objectives, to be exercised under relevant U.N. Security Council resolu-
tions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of
war."40 The appellation "Coalition Provisional Authority" was a literal title
in every aspect: 1) It represented the members of the coalition ultimately
composed of over twenty nations, 2) it was intended to be a temporary
power to bridge the gap to a full restoration of Iraqi sovereign authority,
and 3) (perhaps most importantly) it exercised the obligations incumbent
on those states occupying Iraq in the legal sense, and conversely enjoyed
the legal authority flowing from the laws and customs of war. This under-
standing of CPA status comports with the diplomatic representations made
at the time of its formation.4 1 The United Nations Security Council unani-
mously recognized "the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obliga-
tions under applicable international law of these states (the members of the
coalition) as occupying powers under unified command (the "Author-
ity")."'42 The CPA was therefore recognized as the entity legally responsible
for implementing the obligations imposed by the law of occupation.
Security Council Resolution 1483 passed unanimously on May 22,
2003, and called upon the members of the CPA to "comply fully with their
39. The Mission Statement read in full as follows:
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is the name of the temporary gov-
erning body which has been designated by the United Nations as the lawful
government of Iraq until such time as Iraq is politically and socially stable
enough to assume its sovereignty. The CPA has been the government of Iraq
since the overthrow of the brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein and his deeply
corrupt Ba'ath Regime in April of 2003.
COALITION PROVISIONAL AuT-o'rry, OVERVIEW, available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
bremerbio.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
40. Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1 (May 16, 2003),
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/ regulations/20030516_CPAREG_1_TheCoalitionProvisional
.Authority..pdf. The CPA website is the only existing public record of actions taken by
the CPA.
41. See Letter from the Permanent Representatives of the UK and the US to the UN
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, May 8, 2003, UN Doc. S/2003/538,
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/0608
usukletter.htm (last visited June 26, 2005).
42. S.C. Res. 1483, cl 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
Vol. 38
2005 The Iraqi Special Tribunal
obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907."43 Resolution
1483 is particularly noteworthy for the formation of the IST because the
Security Council specifically highlighted the need for an accountability
mechanism "for crimes and atrocities committed by the previous Iraqi
regime."44 The Security Council further required the CPA to exercise its
temporary power over Iraq in a manner "consistent with the Charter of the
United Nations and other relevant international law, to promote the welfare
of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory."
45
Though strikingly similar to the declaration of allied power in occupied
Germany after World War 11,46 CPA Regulation 1 was therefore founded on
bedrock legal authority flowing from the Chapter VII power of the Security
Council as supplemented by the preexisting power granted to the occupier
by the laws and customs of war.
4 7
Resolution 1483 operated in conjunction with the residual laws and
customs of war to establish positive legal authority for the formation of the
IST by the CPA and Governing Council. The subtle linkage between Article
43 of the Hague Regulations and Article 64 gave the CPA broad discretion
to delegate the authority for promulgation of the IST to the Governing
Council as a matter of necessity. At its core, Article 64 protects the rights
of citizens in the occupied territory to a fair and effective system of justice.
As a first step, and citing its obligation to ensure the "effective administra-
tion of justice," the CPA issued an order suspending the imposition of capi-
tal punishment in the criminal courts of Iraq and prohibiting torture as
well as cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment in occupied Iraq.48 The
43. Id. 9t 5.
44. Id.
45. Id. 9 4.
46. General Eisenhower's Proclamation said: "Supreme legislative, judicial, and exec-
utive authority and powers within the occupied territory are vested in me as Supreme
Commander of the Allied Forces and as Military Governor, and the Military Government
is established to exercise these powers .... reprinted in MILITARY GOVERNMENT GAZETTE,
Issue A, June 1, 1946, at 1 (publication of the Office of Military Government for Ger-
many (U.S.)) (copy on file with author).
47. The Fourth Geneva Convention recognized the importance of individual rights
enjoyed by the civilian population and the correlative duties of the occupier to that pop-
ulation. The structure of the Fourth Convention rejected the concept of debellatio by
focusing on the duties that an Occupying Power has towards the individual civilians and
the overall societal structure rather than focusing on the relations between the victorious
sovereign and the defeated government. Under the rejected concept of debellatio, the
enemy was utterly defeated and accordingly the defeated state forfeited its legal person-
ality and was absorbed into the sovereignty of the occupier. GREENSPAN, supra note 33, at
600-01. The successful negotiation of the Geneva Conventions in the aftermath of
World War II marked the definitive rejection of the concept of debellatio, under which
the occupier assumed full sovereignty over the civilians in the occupied territory. EYAL
BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 95 (1993). Debellatio "refers to a
situation in which a party to a conflict has been totally defeated in war, its national
institutions have disintegrated, and none of its allies continue militarily to challenge the
enemy on its behalf." Id. at 92.
48. COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER
NUMBER 7: PENAL CODE (2003), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/200306
10_CPAORD-7PenalCode.pdf.
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declaration of a duty to ensure the "effective administration of justice" in
CPA Order Number 7 was an inarguable derivative of the duty imposed by
Security Council Resolution 1483 to work towards the "effective adminis-
tration of the territory" of Iraq. Exercising his power as the temporary
occupation authority, Ambassador Bremer signed CPA Order Number 7,
which suspended some aspects of domestic law and amended the Iraqi
Criminal Code in other important ways seeking to suspend or modify laws
that "the former regime used . . . as a tool of repression in violation of
internationally recognized human rights. "4 9
Furthermore, the subsequent promulgation of CPA Policy Memoran-
dum Number 3 on June 18, 2003 was based on the treaty obligation to
eliminate obstacles to the application of the Geneva Conventions because it
amended key provisions of the Iraqi Criminal Code in order to protect the
rights of the civilians in Iraq.50 The Fourth Geneva Convention prescribed
a range of procedural due process rights for the civilian population in
occupied territories that presaged the evolution of human rights norms
following World War 11.51 The implementation of these goals in Iraq
accorded with the established body of occupation law and simultaneously
fulfilled the requirements of Security Council Resolution 1483 pursuant to
the duty of all states to "accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council."'5 2 Though Policy Memorandum Number 3 effectively aligned
Iraqi domestic procedure and law with the requirements of international
law, it was at best a stopgap measure that was neither designed nor
intended to bear the full weight of prosecuting the range of crimes commit-
ted by the regime. Indeed, Section 1 of the original June 18, 2003 Policy
Memorandum Number 3 expressly focused on the "need to transition" to
an effective administration of domestic justice weaned from a "dependency
on military support. '53
The second paragraph of Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
is the key to understanding the promulgation of the IST. Juxtaposed
against the Article 64 authority to "subject the population of the occupied
territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power
to fulfill its obligation under the present Convention,"54 Article 47 of the
Convention makes clear that such "provisions" may include sweeping
49. Id.
50. COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, COALITION PROVISIONAL AuTHORITY MEMORAN-
DUM NUMBER 3: CRIMINAL PROCEDURES (REVISED) (2004), available at http://www.iraqcoa-
lition.org/regulations/20040627CPAMEMO 3_CriminalProceduresRev..pdf.
51. Articles 64-78 of the Fourth Convention detail a range of specific rights belong-
ing to the civilian population of the occupied territory that correspond to those gener-
ally accepted as core human rights provisions, inter alia, the right to a fair trial with the
accompanying due process, credit for pretrial confinement, etc. Geneva IV, supra note
10, arts. 64-78. Cf. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, opened
for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23,
1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] (describing analogous provisions derived from international
human rights law).
52. U.N. Charter art. 25.
53. Copy on file with author.
54. Geneva IV, supra note 10, art. 64(2).
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changes to the domestic legal and governmental structures. Article 47
implicitly concedes power to the occupying force to "change ... the institt.
tions or government" of the occupied territory, so long as those changes do
not deprive the population of the benefits of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion.55 Of particular note to the IST process, Article 47 also prevented the
CPA from effectuating changes that would undermine the rights enjoyed by
the civilian population "by any agreement concluded between the authori-
ties of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power." 56 Thus, the CPA
could not hide behind the fig leaf of domestic decision making to simply
stand by as domestic authorities in occupied Iraq created a process that
would have undermined the human rights of those Iraqi citizens accused
of even the most severe human rights abuses during the period of the
"entombed regime." United States Army doctrine reflects this understand-
ing of the normative relationship with the reminder that "restrictions
placed upon the authority of a belligerent government cannot be avoided
by a system of using a puppet government, central or local, to carry out
acts which would have been unlawful if performed directly by the
occupant." 57
The Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention also makes clear
that the occupying power may modify domestic institutions (which would
include the judicial system and the laws applicable thereto) when the
existing institutions or government of the occupied territory operate to
deprive human beings of "the rights and safeguards provided for them"
under the Fourth Geneva Convention.5 8 These provisions of occupation
law are consistent with the allied experiences during the post-World War II
occupations, and were intended to permit future occupation forces to
achieve the salutary effects inherent in rebuilding or restructuring domes-
tic legal systems when the demands of justice require such reconstruction.
Against that legal backdrop, direct CPA promulgation of the IST Statute
and the accompanying reforms to the existing Iraqi court system could
have been justified based on any of the three permissible purposes speci-
fied in Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (i.e. fulfilling its treaty
obligation to protect civilians, maintaining orderly government over a rest-
less population demanding accountability for the crimes suffered under
Saddam, or enhancing the security of coalition forces).
In other words, both Articles 47 and 64 provided a positive right to the
CPA to impose a structure on the Iraqis for the prosecution of the gravest
crimes of the Ba'athist regime. Given the state of occupation law, the real-
ity of the matter is that the delegation of authority to the Governing Coun-
55. Id. art. 47.
56. Id.
57. FM 27-10, supra note 11, 1 366 (further specifying that "Acts induced or com-
pelled by the occupant are nonetheless its acts").
58. See IV COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF
CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 274 (O.M. Uhler & H. Coursier eds. 1960) (explaining
the intended implementation of the language of Article 47, Civilians Convention: "any
change introduced" to domestic institutions by the occupying power must protect the
rights of the civilian population).
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cil to establish the IST meant that it was grounded in the soil of sovereignty
rather than being susceptible to a portrayal of the tribunal as a vehicle for
foreign domination. If the CPA had the power to unilaterally create a struc-
ture for the prosecution of leading Ba'athists, the decision to delegate
responsibility for developing and promulgating the IST to the Iraqi officials
follows as a logical extension. Closer examination shows that the forma-
tion of the IST under the authority of the Governing Council actually mir-
rored the practice in World War 11 occupations in which the British and
Americans created guidelines to direct Germany towards democracy, but
ultimately gave the Germans great latitude in rebuilding their country.
5 9
At the same time, the affirmative obligations of Article 47 required a
CPA role to ensure that the judicial structure that emerged as a function of
Iraqi domestic politics and was promulgated as a domestic statute fully
complied with relevant human rights obligations 60 as well as the specific
treaty obligations that inhere to the people of Iraq as "protected persons"
59. See Walter M. Hudson, The U.S. Military Government and the Establishment of
Democratic Reform, Federalism, and Constitutionalism During the Occupation of Bavaria,
1945-47, 180 MIL. L. REV. 115, 123 (2004).
60. A full discussion of the extent to which human rights law applies in an occupa-
tion environment is beyond the scope of this paper. There is a growing awareness that
some aspects of human rights may apply extraterritorially alongside the conventional
obligations found in occupation law. The precise interrelationship between occupation
law and human rights norms is debatable and ill-defined at present. See, e.g., Bankovic
a.o. v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States (admissibility decision), no. 52207/99,
1 71, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001-XII (2001), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (enter 52207 in "Application Number" field) (declaring in
dicta on the one hand that the European Convention may impose obligations on states
parties anywhere they exercise "effective control" while in another paragraph, 91 80, lim-
iting that gratuitous language to territory that "for the specific circumstances, would
normally be covered by the Convention" which means those state parties signatory).
Contra Issa a.o. v. Turkey (admissibility decision), no. 31821/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (enter 31821
in "Application Number" field, then select 2000 decision).
Obliquely referring to the connection between the two distinct bodies of law, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights noted in dicta that
While the extraterritorial application of the American Declaration has not been
placed at issue by the parties, the Commission finds it pertinent to note that,
under certain circumstances, the exercise of its jurisdiction over acts with an
extraterritorial locus will not only be consistent with but required by the norms
which pertain. The fundamental rights of the individual are proclaimed in the
Americas on the basis of the principles of equality and non-discrimination-
"without distinction as to race, nationality, creed or sex." Given that individual
rights inhere simply by virtue of a person's humanity, each American State is
obliged to uphold the protected rights of any person subject to its jurisdiction.
While this most commonly refers to persons within a state's territory, it may,
under given circumstances, refer to conduct with an extraterritorial locus where
the person concerned is present in the territory of one state, but subject to the
control of another state-usually through the acts of the latter's agents abroad.
In principle, the inquiry turns not on the presumed victim's nationality or pres-
ence within a particular geographic area, but on whether, under the specific
circumstances, the State observed the rights of a person subject to its authority
and control.
Coard v. United States, Case 10.95 1, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/00, OEA/Ser. L./
V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. 91 37 (1999), available at http://www.oas.org.
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within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions. The development of the
IST Statute was an authentic partnership between Iraqi officials and Coali-
tion officials who had the legal duty to protect the rights of all Iraqis. Nev-
ertheless, the process of developing the statute was opaque to the outside
world, which at the time allowed some observers to criticize the IST
because of the perception (and assumption) that it would function in fact
as a "puppet court of the occupying power." 6 1 Lawyers hired by Saddam
Hussein's wife rapidly played the legitimacy card by claiming that the IST
could not impose any punishments lawfully because it lacked legitimacy,
or lawful creation.6 2
Despite these early and unfounded criticisms, the delegation of
authority to the Governing Council to develop and implement the IST did
serve to increase the legitimacy of the institution and enhance the long
range utility of the IST as a vehicle for restoring respect for the rule of law
to the citizenry of Iraq. The people of Iraq demanded justice, and the even-
tual imposition of individual criminal responsibility on regime elites is
likely to be far more beneficial to the ultimate restoration of respect for the
rule of law when its genesis and execution are the responsibility of Iraqi
officials whose interests are directly linked to the long term welfare of the
Iraqi people.
II. The Structure of the Iraqi Special Tribunal
A. Organs of the Tribunal
The Iraqi jurists who gathered in Baghdad in December 2003 were
anxious to learn about the best practices for ensuring a neutral and effec-
tive judicial system free to function beyond the reach of political control.
The Statute echoes this concern by mandating in its very first provision
that the IST "shall be an independent entity and not associated with any
Iraqi government departments. '63 Because the Iraqi domestic system is
built on a civil law model, the IST is the most modern effort to meld com-
mon and civil law principles into a consolidated system that comports with
accepted standards of justice. The tribunal is structured similarly to the
existing ad hoc international tribunals in that it contains one or more trial
61. Michael P. Scharf, Is it International Enough?: A Critique of the Iraqi Special Tribu-
nal in Light of the Goals of International Justice, 2 J. INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 330, 331 (2004)
(the gravamen of the criticism was focused on the truisms that the 1ST statute had been
drafted during the occupation by the United States, its funding was coming from the
United States, its judges were selected by the U.S.-appointed provisional government,
and the judges and prosecutors were to be assisted by U.S. advisors).
62. See Rory McCarthy & Jonathan Steele, Legitimacy and Neutrality of Court will
be Challenged, THE GuAR1iAN (London), July 2, 2004, available at http://www.gtiardian.
co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1252096,00.html.
63. IST Statute, supra note 4, art. 1(a). On May 8, 2004, Ambassador Bremer issued
Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum Number 12: Administration of Indepen-
dent Judiciary, which laid out the governmental structures and procedures needed to
ensure a robust and independent judiciary, available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/index.html# Memoranda (last visited June 4, 2005).
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chambers, 6 4 and an appeals chamber 6 5 that is chaired by the president of
the tribunal who is responsible for exercising oversight of the "administra-
tive and financial aspects of the Tribunal. 6
6
Additionally, the tribunal contains a prosecutions department of up to
twenty prosecutors. 6 7 Reflecting the concern of Iraqi jurists who watched
the Ba'athist machinery corrode the rule of law, the Statute makes clear
that "[e]ach Prosecutor shall act independently. He or she shall not seek or
receive instructions from any Governmental Department or from any other
source, including the Governing Council or the Successor Government. '"68
Lastly, up to twenty tribunal investigative judges will be responsible
for gathering evidence of crimes within the jurisdiction of the IST "from
whatever source" considered "suitable."' 69 As they investigate individuals
for the commission of crimes proscribed under the statute, the investiga-
tive judges will serve for a term of three years under terms and conditions
as set out in the preexisting Iraqi judicial organization law. As a critical
aspect of their mandate, the investigative judges "shall act independently as
a separate organ of the Tribunal" and "shall not seek or receive instructions
from any Governmental Department, or from any other source, including
the Governing Council or the Successor Government."7
B. Jurisdictional Reach of the IST
The principle that states are obligated to use domestic forums to pun-
ish violations of international law has roots that run back to the ideas of
Hugo Grotius. 7 1 The United States Constitution incorporated this idea as
an expression of congressional power in Article 1, § 8.72 As early as 1842,
American Secretary of State Daniel Webster articulated the idea that a
nation's sovereignty also entails "the strict and faithful observance of all
those principles, laws, and usages which have obtained currency among
civilized states, and which have for their object the mitigation of the mis-
eries of war."'73 Though internationalized judicial mechanisms have per-
64. Each of which, according to Article 4 of the statute, will consist of five "perma-
nent independent judges" and independent reserve judges. IST Statute, supra note 4,
art. 4(a)-(b).
65. The Appeals Chamber has "the power to review the decisions of the Trial Cham-
bers." Id. art. 3. The IST Appeals Chamber proceedings should be deemed sufficient to
protect the basic human right to an appeal just as the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC appellate
chambers have been accepted by states.
66. Id. art. 4(c)(ii).
67. Id. art. 8(c).
68. Id. art. 8(b).
69. Id. art. 7(c), (i).
70. Id. art. 7(j).
71. See RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT 102-03 (1999).
72. Empowering the legislative branch to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations." U.S. CONST. art
I, § 8.
73. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, 1 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-6 (1906).
Vol. 38
2005 The Iraqi Special Tribunal
manently altered the face of international law,7 4 the domestic courts of
sovereign states are the courts of first resort while international mecha-
nisms provide a useful but not essential backdrop in circumstances where
the domestic courts are unable or unwilling to enforce individual accounta-
bility for serious violations of international norms. 75 The IST is built on
the truism that sovereign states retain primary responsibility for adjudicat-
ing violations of crimes defined and promulgated under international
law.
7 6
Grounded as it is in the right of a sovereign state to punish its nation-
als for violations of international norms, the temporal jurisdiction of the
IST covers any Iraqi national or resident of Iraq charged with crimes listed
in the Statute that were committed between July 17, 1968 and May 1, 2003
inclusive. 77 In addition, its geographic jurisdiction extends to acts commit-
ted on the sovereign soil of the Republic of Iraq, as well as those committed
in other nations, including crimes committed in connection with Iraq's
wars against the Islamic Republic of Iran and the State of Kuwait. 78
Articles 11-13 of the statute establish the competence of the tribunal
to prosecute genocide (Article 11), crimes against humanity (Article 12),
and war crimes committed during both international and non-interna-
tional armed conflicts (Article 13). 79 These substantive provisions are per-
haps the most significant aspects of the statute because they accurately
incorporate the most current norms under international humanitarian law
into the fabric of Iraqi domestic law for the first time. In addition, Article
14 conveys jurisdiction over a core group of crimes defined in the Iraqi
Criminal Code. 80 Article 14 of the IST Statute is one of the strongest
pieces of evidence that the drafting of the statute was a genuine collabora-
tive process in which the Governing Council spoke strongly on behalf of
the citizens it represented.
74. See generally PAUL R. WILLIAMS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE? WAR
CRIMES AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (2002).
75. See Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Con-
sistent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20,
26-27 (2001).
76. The necessity for domestic states to use domestic criminal forums and penal
authority to enforce norms developed in binding international agreements is perhaps
one of the most consistent features of the body of law known as international criminal
law. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
art. V, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951)
(obligating Contracting Parties to enact the necessary domestic legislation to give effect
to the criminal provisions of the Convention). Of particular note in the post 9/11 world,
the imposition of criminal accountability for acts of terrorism is exclusively reserved to
the courts of sovereign states through the welter of treaties created by sovereign states.
See Michael Newton, International Criminal Law Aspects of the War Against Terrorism, in
79 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WAR ON TERROR 323 (Fred L. Borch & Paul S. Wilson,
eds., 2003); see also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CON-
VENTIONS 1937-2001 (2001).
77. IST Statute, supra note 4, art. 38.
78. Id.
79. Id. arts. 11-13.
80. Id. art. 14.
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The Iraqi lawyers involved in drafting the Statute educated the Ameri-
can lawyers about the contents of the Iraqi Criminal Code and demanded
inclusion of a select list of domestic crimes because the proscribed acts
were so corrosive to the rule of law inside Saddam's Iraq. Article 14
accordingly reads as follows:
The Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons who have committed
the following crimes under Iraqi law:
a) For those outside the judiciary, the attempt to manipulate the judiciary or
involvement in the functions of the judiciary, in violation, inter alia, of the
Iraqi interim constitution of 1970, as amended;
b) The wastage of national resources and the squandering of public assets
and funds, pursuant to, inter alia, Article 2 (g) of Law Number 7 of 1958, as
amended; and
c) The abuse of position and the pursuit of policies that may lead to the
threat of war or the use of the armed forces of Iraq against an Arab country,
in accordance with Article 1 of Law Number 7 of 1958, as amended.81
For armchair lawyers tempted to dismiss the tribunal as a bald asser-
tion of coalition power, Article 14 is a window into the soul of the Iraqi bar
because it reveals the offenses deemed most egregious by peace-loving
Iraqis seeking to rebuild an Iraq based on freedom. The officials who com-
mitted the acts included in Article 14 in essence waged war on the Iraqi
people and society; the prosecution of those acts was seen by the Iraqis as a
prerequisite for restoring the rule of law inside Iraq. From the Iraqi per-
spective, the crimes listed in Article 14 are of comparable severity to the
grave violations of international norms found in Articles 11-13. There-
fore, the Iraqis felt that prosecution of the domestic crimes described in
Article 14 would be a necessary component of the broader IST objective of
helping to heal the wounds inflicted on Iraqi society by the Ba'athists.
Furthermore, Article 14(a) is especially notable. Inclusion of the
domestic offense of involvement in the functions of the judiciary implicitly
signifies the urgent priority that the Iraqis attach to judicial independence.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) requires
a "fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tri-
bunal established by law."'8 2 As a matter of historical record, the mechan-
ics of establishing a judiciary free of political control was the very first
question asked as the DIILS team began to teach the jurists assembled in
Baghdad in December 2003.83 Ba'athist deprivation of trial rights and the
subsequent imposition of punishment as an extension of Ba'athist political
power unrelated to evidence had a traumatizing effect on Iraqi society. The
search for truth based on evidence rather than raw power is the essence of
a legitimate trial process. The perversion of legitimate judicial functions
under the farce of politically motivated playacting was an especially galling
81. Id.
82. ICCPR, supra note 51, art. 14.
83. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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aspect of Saddam's rule for those trained jurists whose proper judicial
functions were bypassed and undermined by the regime.
Given this history, the provision of fair trials in the IST will be an
important aspect of its legitimacy and serve as an important contrast to the
fraudulent processes under the regime. The right to a fair and public hear-
ing before an independent and impartial tribunal established by law is a
basic right derived from both human rights norms8 4 and the law of occu-
pation (as a subset of the laws and customs of war). 85 While the statute
itself mandates the independent functioning of both the investigative
judges and the prosecution, there is no such correlative provision regarding
the judges serving in either the Trial or Appeals Chambers. This gap led
Human RightsWatch to recommend that the judges be required in writing
to act independently and receive no instructions from any external
source. 86 Despite the picayune textual crease pointed out by Human
Rights Watch, the very fact that the Iraqis demanded the inclusion of Arti-
cle 14(a) strongly compels the conclusion that they will be keenly sensitive
to any attempts to exert political control over the conduct of trials and
fiercely resistant to external attempts to manipulate the IST.
The early experience of the IST also demonstrates that it is a robust
institution that has to date been able to withstand pressures on its indepen-
dent operation.8 7 Awareness of Saddam's successful efforts to undermine
the real rule of law through the facade of justice also explains one unusual
but little noticed linguistic quirk found in the English translation of the
IST's name. The jurists who gathered in Baghdad in December 2003
expressed a great deal of outrage at the manner in which the Hussein
regime imposed its will on the Iraqi people through the use of Special or
"Revolutionary" courts conducted by untrained minions. 88 As a group,
84. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of the Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Annex II, art.
6(2), Dec. 12, 1977, 26 I.L.M. 561 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol
II]; ICCPR, supra note 51, art. 14(1); European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinaf-
ter ECHRI; American Convention on Human Rights "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica" art.
8(1), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S., No. 36, 9 I.L.M. 101 [hereinafter ACHR].
85. Geneva IV, supra note 10, art. 147; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War art. 130, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter
Convention on Prisoners of War]; Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 75(4) (slightly changing
the formulation to read as follows "impartial and regularly constituted court respecting
the generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure").
86. Memorandum from Human Rights Watch to the Iraqi Governing Council, 'The
Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal' § A.I., (Dec. 2003), available at http://www.hrw.
org/backgrounder/mena/iraql2l703.htmo
87. For example, when campaigning prior to the national elections held on January
30, 2005, interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi repeatedly sought to gain votes by
frequently assuring both domestic and international audiences that the trials of leading
Ba'athists (including Saddam Hussein and Chemical Ali) would begin imminently. The
IST has thus far resisted exogenous pressures to rush the investigation and prosecution
of cases, and has stated that trials would begin when judges are fully trained, and the
development of cases is completed by the investigating judges and prosecutors.
88. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Tribunal Planners Hope to Start Trials by Spring, WASH.
POST, Dec. 16, 2003, at Al.
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they were pleased to see the inclusion of Article 14(a). Despite the fact that
the statute plainly covers the full range of crimes recognized under current
international law (genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the
laws and customs of war during both international and non-international
armed conflicts), the Iraqi officials who drafted the Tribunal Statute were
determined to demonstrate the contrast between the IST and the corrupt
judicial farces ordered by the regime. As a deliberate amendment at the
very last editing session, the authoritative Arabic text used a different term
to make a clear distinction from the "Special" or "Revolutionary" courts
run under Ba'athist authority, which resulted in a slightly off kilter English
translation. Article 1 of the IST Statute accordingly states "[a] Tribunal is
hereby established and shall be known as the "Iraqi Special Tribunal for
Crimes Against Humanity."8 9 This subtle, but powerful reminder shows
the keen judicial awareness of the Iraqi lawyers responsible for the IST stat-
ute as well as their commitment to the long-term restoration of the rule of
law within Iraq.
C. Procedural Rights for the Accused 90
The provisions governing the right of the accused are among the most
highly scrutinized and vital provisions of the IST Statute. The Coalition
Provisional Authority Order that delegated authority to the Iraqi leaders to
promulgate the Statute required that the IST meet "international standards
of justice."9 ' Under the terms of the statute, the Trial Chambers must
"ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are con-
ducted in accordance with this Statute and the rules of procedure and evi-
dence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the
protection of victims and witnesses. '92 To illustrate the transformation of
justice in a free Iraq, the statute specifies that "[n]o officer, prosecutor,
investigative judge, judge or other personnel of the Tribunal shall have
been a member of the Ba'ath Party." 93
In its core operative provision, the statute incorporates a full range of
trial rights that, in the aggregate, are fully compatible with applicable
89. IST Statute, supra note 4, art. 1(a).
90. The Iraqi lawyers selected this term rather than "perpetrator" that was used in
the International Criminal Court Elements of Crimes. There was extensive debate
during the drafting of the Elements of Crimes for the International Criminal Court over
the relative merits of the terms "perpetrator" or "accused." Though some delegations
were concerned that the term perpetrator would undermine the presumption of
innocence, the delegates to the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) ultimately agreed
to use the former in the Elements after including a comment in the introductory chapeau
that "the term 'perpetrator"' is neutral as to guilt or innocence. See KNOT DORMANN,
ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 9-16 (2002).
91. See COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER
NUMBER 48: DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY REGARDING AN IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL 2 (2003),
available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20031210_CPAORD_48_IST-and_
Appendix_- A.pdf.
92. IST Statute, supra note 4, art. 21(b).
93. Id. art. 33.
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human rights norms. Echoing the fundamental guarantees of the ICCPR94
and other human rights instruments,95 Article 20 of the statute states:
a) All persons shall be equal before the Tribunal.
b) Everyone shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty before the Tribu-
nal in accordance with the law.
c) In the determination of any charge, the accused shall be entitled to a pub-
lic hearing, having regard to the provisions of the Statute and the rules of
procedure made hereunder.
d) In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the
present Statute, the accused shall be entitled to a fair hearing conducted
impartially and to the following minimum guarantees:
1. to be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content
of the charge against him;
2. to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense
and to communicate freely with counsel of his own choosing in confi-
dence. The accused is entitled to have non-Iraqi legal representation, so
long as the principal lawyer of such accused is Iraqi;
3. to be tried without undue delay;
4. to be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through
legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have
legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to
him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without
payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to
pay for it;
5. to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the
same conditions as witnesses against him. The accused shall also be
entitled to raise defences and to present other evidence admissible under
this Statute and Iraqi law; and
6. not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt, and to
remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in the determi-
nation of guilt or innocence.
96
Article 20 of the IST Statute provides the range of personal rights to
breathe life into the esoteric obligation found in Article 20 of the 1970
Interim Constitution of Iraq, which provides that an accused is "innocent,
until proved guilty at a legal trial." 9 7 The Constitution also proclaims in
94. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
95. See generally supra note 79 and accompanying text.
96. IST Statute, supra note 4, art. 21(b). This provision of the IST Statute preventing
any adverse inference from the silence of the accused is noteworthy because it is the first
time that such a protection was specifically found in Iraqi law.
97. AL-DUSTUR AL-Mo'AKAT [Provisional Constitution] (1970) (Iraq) art. 20, reprinted
in UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, IRAQI LAWS REFERENCED IN THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL (2004). The 1970 Interim Constitution is also available at http://
www.mallat.com (last visited June 19, 2005). The Iraqi Law on Criminal Proceedings
makes clear that the judge must release an accused if "there is insufficient evidence for
conviction." Law on Criminal Proceedings with Amendments, Number 23 of 1971,
Decree No. 230 Issued by the Revolutionary Command Council, Feb. 14, 1971, f 203
[hereinafter Iraqi Law No. 23 on Criminal Proceedings], available at https://www.jagc
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evocative terms that "the right of defence is sacred in all stages of investiga-
tion and trial in accordance with the provisions of the Law."98 The paral-
lelism between Article 20 of the Constitution and Article 20 of the IST
Statute is pure coincidence, but illustrates a judicial integrity and aware-
ness of individual rights that is ingrained in the Iraqi legal consciousness.
During his first appearance before an IST investigative judge, Saddam Hus-
sein challenged the legal authority of the IST and demanded to know "how
can you charge me with anything without protecting my rights under the
constitution."99 At the time of this writing, Saddam remains in custody on
the authority of the investigative judge who decided at that July 2004 hear-
ing that there was probable cause to believe that he had committed one or
more offenses within the jurisdiction of the 1ST; along with the other lead-
ing Ba'athists, he is not currently facing any definite criminal charges, but
will eventually benefit from the procedural and personal rights embodied
in the IST process.
III. The Human Rights Infrastructure of the Iraqi Special Tribunal
A. The Synthesis of Civil and Common Law in the IST
International tribunals and the more recent phenomenon of interna-
tionalized domestic tribunals require a complex intermingling of procedu-
ral approaches derived from both civil and common law. Modern
accountability mechanisms permit a range of hearsay evidence that would
never be admitted for trial purposes in common law courtrooms' 00 while
often providing provisions for plea agreements designed to enhance the
efficiency of adjudication in a manner seldom seen in civil law systems. 1 1
Civil law systems driven by investigative judges provide for more expedi-
tious trial proceedings which minimize discrimination between rich and
poor perpetrators because the investigative judge is charged with collecting
net.army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf/ (follow "Iraq
Criminal Procedure Code" hyperlink).
98. Id. All of the judges and investigators with whom I have dealt have been com-
pletely comfortable with the presumption of innocence and the duty of the prosecutor to
produce evidence sufficient to warrant a guilty verdict.
99. Rupert Cornwell, Saddam in the Dock: Listen to His Victims, Not Saddam, Says
White House, THE INDEPENDENT (London), July 2, 2004, at 6 (reporting that Hussein
stated "[t]his is all theater" at his first pretrial hearing). For those who have observed
the Milogevie trial, Saddam's statements were eerily familiar. During his initial appear-
ance before the ICTY on July 3, 2001, Milogevit challenged the legality of the establish-
ment of the ICTY. In a pretrial motion, Miloevik stated "I challenge the very legality of
this court because it is not established in the basis of law." Milosevic Challenges Legality
of U.N. Tribunal, ONLINE NEwsHOUR, Feb. 13, 2002, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/up
dates/february02/milosevic_2-13.html.
100. GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 135-40 (2003).
101. Id. at 113-16. See also Revised Version of Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence, rules 57 and 58, available at http://www.law.case.edu/war-crimes-
research-portal/pdf/IST RulesofProcedureandEvidence.pdf (last visited June 19,
2005) (detailing the procedures and substantive provisions for the entry of a guilty plea
in the IST).
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evidence to support all sides of the case (the.defense team is therefore not
required to spend its own resources in gathering exculpatory evidence). 10 2
On the other hand, the adversarial system may be more suited to a full
airing of the available evidence in court and may be best suited for the
purpose of compiling an accurate and comprehensive record of the history
associated with the crimes in question, which after all is one of the vital
purposes of individual accountability mechanisms. 10 3 Paraphrasing Jus-
tice Jackson's assessment of the International Military Tribunal at Nurem-
berg, "no history" of the era of Iraq under Ba'athist rule will be "entitled to
authority" if it ignores the factual and legal conclusions that will be
presented in open court in the IST.104
The procedures for the introduction of evidence are perhaps the most
notable aspect of the commingling of common and civil law traditions.
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg set the precedent for
simplifying evidentiary requirements in favor of a full airing of available
facts before a panel of judges. Justice Jackson noted "peculiar and techni-
cal rules of evidence developed under the common-law system of jury trials
to prevent the jury from being influenced by improper evidence constitute
a complex and artificial science," and accordingly accepted that rules of
evidence at Nuremberg should put the premium on the probative value of
the evidence. 10 5 Justice Jackson also commented on the reality that, while
dispensing with rigid rules of evidence gave the International Military Tri-
bunal "a large and somewhat unpredictable discretion," it also permitted
both the prosecution and defense to select "evidence on the basis of what it
was worth as proof rather than whether it complied with some technical
requirement."106
Since 1945, rather than operating under restrictive rules of evidence,
all of the tribunals applying international humanitarian law have permit-
ted evidence so long as it is relevant and "necessary for the determination
of the truth."10 7 This standard (drawn from the International Criminal
Court Statute) compares favorably to the IST Rule of Procedure that per-
102. UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, SPECIAL REPORT 122, BUILDING THE IRAQI SPE-
cIAL TRIBUNAL: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCES IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 6 (2004)
[hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT 1221, available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/
sr122.html.
103. See Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams, The Functions of Justice and Anti-Justice
in the Peace-Building Process, 35 CASE. W. RES. J. INT'L L. 161, 175 (2003).
104. Robert Jackson, Report to the President by Mr. Justice Jackson, in REPORT OF RoB-
ERT H. JACKSON UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MIL-
ITARY TRIALS 432, 438 (1945) (ustice Jackson also wrote: "[wie have documented from
German sources the Nazi aggressions, persecutions, and atrocities with such authentic-
ity and in such detail that there can be no responsible denial of these crimes in the
future and no tradition of martyrdom of the Nazi leaders can arise among informed
people.").
105. Id. at xi. Interestingly, as a matter of historical record, the teams of international
prosecutors at Nuremberg did not develop the detailed Elements of Crimes that have
become an accepted feature of every subsequent international process.
106. Id.
107. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 69(3), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm.
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mits the Trial Chamber to admit "any relevant evidence which it deems to
have probative value." 10 8 Rather than developing a straitjacket set of rules
related to the introduction of evidence, the IST Trial Chamber has the
broader mandate to "apply rules of evidence which will best favour a fair
determination of the matter before it and [which] are consonant with the
spirit of the Statute and general principles of law."'1 9 Of course, these
evidentiary provisions operate against the backdrop of Iraqi procedural law
that requires the prosecutor to produce a quantum of evidence sufficient to
satisfy the court of the guilt of the defendant. 110
Regardless of the procedural forms adopted, international law is clear
that no accused should face punishment unless convicted pursuant to a
fair trial affording all of the essential guarantees embodied in widespread
state practice."1 Common Article 3 (meaning that it is repeated as article
3 in each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949) states this principle
with particularity by requiring that only a "regularly constituted court"
may pass judgment on an accused person. 112 Interpreting this provision in
light of state practice, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) concluded that a judicial forum is "regularly constituted if it has
been established and organized in accordance with the laws and proce-
dures already in force in a country."' 13 Accepting the ICRC benchmark of
legitimacy, the IST meets the criteria derived from the law of war better
than any of the other tribunals established to adjudicate violations of
humanitarian law because it is designed to apply the general principles of
criminal law drawn from existing Iraqi criminal law rather than simply
supplanting those norms with externally mandated principles. The IST
statute provides that the president of the tribunal "shall be guided by the
Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law" in the drafting of the rules of procedure and
evidence for the admission of evidence as well as the other features of
trial.114 Furthermore, the statute specifically lists the provisions of Iraqi
law that contain the general principles of criminal law to be applied "in
connection with the prosecution and trial of any accused person."1 15
The structure of the IST and its accompanying procedures are simi-
larly valid when measured against applicable human rights principles. The
ICCPR phrases the concept noted above as requiring that a tribunal be
108. Revised Version Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra
note 101, rule 79. This provision is adjacent to the common sense caveat that the Trial
Chamber should "exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the potential for unfair prejudice, considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or need-
less presentation of cumulative evidence." Id.
109. Id.
110. Iraqi Law No. 23 on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 97, 203.
111. For a summary of state practice and its implementation in treaty norms and
military manuals around the world, see 1 JEaN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DoswALo-
BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw 352-75 (2005) [hereinafter ICRC
Study].
112. See, e.g., Geneva IV, supra note 10, art. 3.
113. ICRC Study, supra note 111, at 355.
114. IST Statute, supra note 4, art. 16.
115. Id. art. 17(a) (emphasis added).
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"established by law." 1 6 The United Nations Human Rights Commission
adopted a functional test that the tribunal should "genuinely afford the
accused the full guarantees" in its procedural protections. 117 Litigating its
first case, the ICTY was forced to determine whether this human right is
violated per se by the prosecution of an accused before a post hoc tribunal
created after the commission of the crimes.1 18 Noting that the ICCPR
drafters rejected language specifying that only "pre-established" forums
would provide sufficient human rights protections, the ICTY Appeals
Chamber concluded:
The important consideration in determining whether a tribunal has been
"established by law" is not whether it was pre-established or established for
a specific purpose or situation; what is important is that it be set up by a
competent organ in keeping with the relevant legal procedures, and should
that it observes the requirements of procedural fairness. 1 19
For the purposes of human rights law, the IST is "established by law"
because it is established by the authorities empowered under both interna-
tional law and the authority of the United Nations Security Council and
because it is explicitly designed to provide the full range of human rights to
the accused. The IST Statute establishes a firm duty on the court to
"ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are con-
ducted in accordance with this Statute and the rules of procedure and evi-
dence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the
protection of victims and witnesses."'120 Similarly, the Trial Chamber must
"satisfy itself that the rights of the accused are respected"'12 1 and publicly
support its decisions with "a reasoned opinion in writing, to which sepa-
rate or dissenting opinions may be appended."'12 2 The Iraqi Judicial Law
specifies that the judge shall be bound to "preserve the dignity of the judi-
cature and to avoid any thing that arouses suspicion on his honesty."12 3 A
priori conclusion that the IST judges will ignore their professional ethos by
116. ICCPR, supra note 51, art. 14(1).
117. See Human Rights Comm., General Comment on Article 14, cl 4, U.N. Doc. A/
43/40 (1988); Human Rights Comm., Cariboni v. Uruguay, U.N. Doc. A/39/40 (Oct.
27, 1987). The Inter-American Commission has taken a similar approach. See, e.g.,
Inter-Am C.H.R., Annual Report 1972, OEA/Ser. P, AG/doc. 305/73 rev. 1, 14 March
1973, at 1; Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report 1973, 2-4, OEA/Ser. P, AG/doc. 409/174
(March 5, 1974).
118. See MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNA-
TIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 104-06 (1997).
119. Prosecutor v. Tadic Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 1995 WL 17205280, Decision on the
Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, [ 45 (Oct. 2, 1995), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm.
120. IST Statute, supra note 4, art. 21(b) (emphasis added).
121. Id. art. 21(c).
122. Id. art. 23(b).
123. Law of Judicial Organization, Number 160 of 1979, Resolution No. 1724 Issued
by the Revolutionary Command Council, Oct. 12, 1979, art. 7, Published by the Minis-
try of Justice, Official Gazette of the Republic of Iraq, Vol. 23, No. 27 at 2 (uly 2, 1980),
reprinted in UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, IRAQI LAWS REFERENCED IN THE STATUTE OF
THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL (2004) (copy on file with author).
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willfully undermining the rights of the accused would betray an unseemly
smugness and paternalism on the part of the international community.
The fact of the matter is that the IST Statute and Rules of Procedure
and Evidence are far from unique in their civil law foundations. Each con-
flict environment and accountability mechanism has required a slightly
different set of blended procedures. For example, in the domestic prosecu-
tions in Argentina, the trials were conducted using special procedures
necessitated by the volume of information and the number of victims in
comparison to normal crimes. 124 In the case of the IST, the civil law foun-
dations of the Iraqi Criminal Code provided the baseline, which was then
modified where appropriate to comply with relevant human rights norms
and occupation law. Unlike the ICTY 125 and the Special Court in Sierra
Leone (SCSL), 12 6 the punitive authority of the IST derives from the sover-
eign authority of the Iraqi people rather than the derivative authority of the
United Nations Security Council. The analytical start point for the IST is
therefore found in the existing body of Iraqi laws and procedures, even
though the eventual destination is on the same intellectual block as the
other tribunals. Comparison of the ad hoc tribunals with the treaty based
forums such as the International Criminal Court and the Special Court for
Sierra Leone reveals that these tribunals borrow the "best" elements of
both adversarial and inquisitorial trials. Where there are lacunae that
remain in the IST Rules and Procedures, they are automatically filled by
resort to the underlying principles of Iraqi domestic law, even as the judges
are charged to interpret the substantive international crimes by "resort to
the relevant decisions of international courts or tribunals as persuasive
authority .... ,127
- Finally, the set of principles and rules emplaced at the formation of
the IST will likely not solidify as rigid sets of static constraints. If the IST
Rules and Procedures prove inadequate to ensure full respect for the rights
of the accused as required by the Statute, then the judges may amend the
124. See SPECIAL REPORT 122, supra note 102, at 9-10.
125. See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993).
126. The SCSL was established by a treaty between the Government of Sierra Leone
and the United Nations to prosecute those with the "greatest responsibility" for viola-
tions of international humanitarian law. Agreement between the United Nations and
the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone, U.N.-Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-agreement.html. The
Appeals Chamber articulated the SCSL's legal basis in Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No.
SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction (May 31, 2004), available at
http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSL-03-01-I-059.pdf. The Appeals Chamber stated,
"[I]t was clear that the power of the Security Council to enter into an agreement
for the establishment of the court was derived from the Charter of the United
Nations both in regard to the general purposes of the United Nations as
expressed in Article 1 of the Charter and the specific powers of the Security
Council in Articles 39 and 41. These powers are wide enough to empower the
Security Council to initiate, as it did by Resolution 1315, the establishment of
the Special Court by Agreement with Sierra Leone."
Id. at 18.
127. IST Statute, supra note 4, art. 17(b).
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rules accordingly. 128 The President of the ICTY has said that the frequent
amendments to the tribunal rules are necessary because the judges are
"pragmatic people" grappling with the balance between truth and jus-
tice.1 29 The ICTY Rules of Evidence and Procedure have thus been modi-
fied more than thirty times. In order to facilitate case management and
improve the pace of trials, the ICTY judges have moved away from the com-
mon law moorings prevalent at formation of the ICTY and clearly evolved a
more civil law centric set of rules and procedures.1 3 0 The conclusion is
clear that the IST Rules and Statute are validly promulgated and legally
sufficient to protect the fundamental rights of the accused, but may be
amended if needed due to the emerging exigencies that may arise in the
pragmatic application of the rules as they appear on paper.
B. Cornerstone Procedural Protections for the Accused
No legal issue related to the IST can be definitively determined by ref-
erence to a single source. Article 17(a) of the statute sets out a hierarchy of
sources that will guide the judges: 1) the statute itself, 2) the Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence; and 3) the existing body of Iraqi criminal procedure
and substantive laws.' 3 1 In addition, the IST Statute makes clear that the
judges "may resort to the relevant decisions of international courts or
tribunals as persuasive authority for their decisions. ' 13 2 The IST Statute is
linked to the underlying provisions of Iraqi domestic law and the rules of
procedure and evidence to form a tightly woven fabric of legal protections.
Accordingly, any conclusions derived about the core principles and protec-
tions of the IST can be drawn only after all of the relevant sources are
considered. In a sense, the IST is similar to the ICTY in that the judges will
rely to some extent on analogy to the national laws of the territory where
128. Id. art. 16 ("The President of the Tribunal shall draft rules of procedure and
evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the
admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate
matters (including regulations with respect to the disqualification of judges or prosecu-
tors), where the applicable law, including this Statute does not, or does not adequately
provide for a specific situation .... Such rules shall be adopted by a majority of the
permanent judges of the Tribunal.").
129. Interview by Ljubica Gojgic with Judge Theodor Meron, President of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in Belgrade (Sept. 18, 2003), availa-
ble at www.b92.net/intervju/eng/2003/meron.php. At the time of this writing, there
have been thirty-six sets of amendments to the ICTY Rules of Procedure. See http://
www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/ (last visited June 19, 2005).
130. See KNooPs, supra note 100, at 91-100 (listing a number of specific rules
changes in the ICTY).
131. IST Statute, supra note 4, art. 17(a) ("Subject to the provisions of this Statute and
the rules made thereunder, the general principles of criminal law applicable in connec-
tion with the prosecution and trial of any accused person shall be those contained: (i) in
Iraqi criminal law as at July 17, 1968 (as embodied in The Baghdadi Criminal Code of
1919) for those offenses committed between July 17, 1968 and December 14, 1969; (ii)
in Law Number 111 of 1969 (the Iraqi Criminal Code), as it was as of December 15,
1969, without regard to any amendments made thereafter, for those offenses committed
between December 15, 1969 and May 1, 2003; and (iii) and in Law Number 23 of 1971
(the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law).").
132. Id. art. 17(b).
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the conflict occurred or to what they perceive to be the practices of other
states or tribunals in applying the sophisticated set of principles found in
international humanitarian law. This is identical to the repeated methodol-
ogy of the ICTY judges. 133 The difference for the IST judges is that the
Iraqi process is explicitly built on the preexisting foundation of domestic
law familiar to the judges; hence, the IST Rules of Procedure and the Stat-
ute are often silent or incomplete on a given subject precisely because the
issue is definitively addressed in the underlying domestic code. This arti-
cle will conclude by pointing out some of the most notable areas where a
casual reading of the IST Statute alone would lead to shallow or incomplete
conclusions about the extent of IST protection of the defendant's human
rights.
1. Provision of Counsel
Article 20 of the IST Statute provides for the fundamental right "to
have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of [the] defense and to
communicate freely with counsel ... in confidence."1 3 4 Such counsel may
include non-Iraqi lawyers, so long as the "principal lawyer" is an Iraqi.135
The IST Statute further provides that the tribunal will pay for the costs of
counsel "in any such case if he or she does not have sufficient means to pay
for it."'1 3 6 The experience of the ICTY indicates that this will be a major
expense associated with the IST, as the provision of gratis counsel con-
sumed ten percent of the ICTY budget, to the tune of some $10-13 million
per year.
13 7
The counsel retained by a suspect or accused is then required to "file
his power of attorney with the Judge concerned at the earliest opportu-
nity."13 8 The judge, in turn, shall consider the counsel to be qualified "in
accordance with the Iraqi law of lawyers."'13 9 This small phrase constitutes
an important safeguard in the IST process because it means that the coun-
sel who will practice in the IST chambers remain bound by the codes of
practice and ethics governing their profession and are qualified in accor-
dance with the rigorous standards found in Iraqi law.1 40 In light of the
serious allegations of misconduct of counsel in other tribunals, 14 1 the IST
rules provide that a judge or chamber may impose sanctions against coun-
133. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 332 (2003)
(referring to the Sentencing Judgments in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T,
40 (Nov. 29, 1996) and Prosecutor v. Stevan Todorovic, Case No. IT-95-9/1-S, C CI 97-107
(July 31, 2001)).
134. IST Statute, supra note 4, art. 20(d)(2).
135. Id. art. 18(c).
136. Id.
137. SPECIAL REPORT 122, supra note 102, at 7.
138. Revised Version Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra
note 101, rule 48(A).
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. Id. rule 48(C).
141. For example, repeated abuses by counsel were responsible for the ICTY shift
from paying hourly defense fees to a flat fee system. SPECIAL REPORT 122, supra note
102, at 7.
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sel whose "conduct remains offensive or abusive, demeans the dignity of
the Special Tribunal, [or] obstructs the proceedings."' 1 4 2 Furthermore, tl.,
fact that the principal attorney remains bound by the Iraqi code of profes-
sional conduct gives some force to the underlying right of the court to "pre-
vent the parties and their representatives from speaking at undue length or
speaking outside the subject of the case, repeating statements, violating
guidelines or making accusations against another party or a person outside
the case who is unable to put forward a defense. 143
Apart from providing for the appointment of counsel, the IST gives
counsel a robust and visible role. The IST Rules stipulate that the investi-
gating judge must notify all suspects of the following rights "in a language
he speaks and understands" during their first appearance for questioning:
i. The right to legal assistance of his own choosing, including the right to
have legal assistance provided by the Defense Office if he does not have
sufficient means to pay for it;
ii. The right to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot under-
stand or speak the language to be used for questioning;
iii. The right to remain silent. In this regard, the suspect or accused shall be
cautioned that any statement he makes may be recorded and may be used in
evidence. 14
4
In accordance with Iraqi procedural law, any statement of the accused
to the investigating judge is recorded in the written record and "signed by
the accused and the magistrate or investigator." 1 45 Thus, every suspect (to
include Saddam Hussein) who has appeared before the IST investigative
judges to date has been notified of their rights to counsel and has acknowl-
edged their comprehension of those rights in writing. Those who assume
that the IST will ignore and subvert the rights of defendants in the future
must also assume that the investigative judges will abandon this estab-
lished practice, but in doing so they would depart from a foundational
aspect of criminal practice in Iraq which by any measure meets human
rights standards.
Of course, as would be expected, an accused may voluntarily waive his
right to have legal assistance during questioning, but only if the investiga-
tive judge determines that the waiver is voluntarily and intelligently
made. 14 6 The investigative judge "shall not proceed without the presence
of counsel" when questioning a suspect who has invoked the right to assis-
tance. 14 7 Furthermore, if a suspect has waived his right to counsel but
then invokes that right, "the questioning should be stopped and never
142. Revised Version Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra
note 101, rule 50.
143. Iraqi Law No. 23 on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 97, 154.
144. Revised Version Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra
note 101, rule 46(A).
145. Iraqi Law No. 23 on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 97, 9 128.
146. Revised Version Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra
note 101, rule 46(B).
147. Id. rule 46(C).
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resume again until the defence be present."'148 These provisions comport
fully with the relevant human rights provisions and are in complete accor-
dance with the practices of other international tribunals.
14 9
2. Conduct of the Defense
The primary gap on the face of the IST Statute is that it is silent on the
actual provisions for the defense of an accused. Of course, Article 20 pro-
tects the right to present a full defense, but the Statute itself does not reveal
the manner in which those protections can be achieved. Rule 49 of the IST
Rules of Evidence and Procedure outlines the functions of the Defense
Office as a separate organ inside the IST, beginning with the requirement
that the IST Director "shall establish a Defense Office for the purpose of
ensuring the rights of accused."' 5 0 From that premise, the defense team
operates against the mesh of practice built into the IST framework.
The entire Iraqi criminal justice system is grounded on the role of the
investigative judge as an impartial authority whose mandate is to objec-
tively search for all available evidence, both incriminating and exculpa-
tory. 1 5 ' Indeed, under Iraqi law, investigating officers "are required to use
all available means to preserve evidence of an offense,"'1 52 and must pre-
pare the written report collating the evidence for the subsequent use of
trial judges in the event that charges are documented to warrant a trial.15 3
The IST Rules build on this practice by requiring the prosecutor to provide
all exculpatory evidence to the defense, as well as any evidence which "may
be relevant to issues raised in the Defense Case Statement."'1 54 Under the
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Rule 63 of the ICTY Rules of Evidence and Procedure, available at http:/
/www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm (last visited June 19, 2005), which reads as
follows:
Questioning of Accused
(Adopted 11 Feb 1994, amended 3 Dec 1996)
(A) Questioning by the Prosecutor of an accused, including after the initial
appearance, shall not proceed without the presence of counsel unless the
accused has voluntarily and expressly agreed to proceed without counsel pre-
sent. If the accused subsequently expresses a desire to have counsel, question-
ing shall thereupon cease, and shall only resume when the accused's counsel is
present.
(B) The questioning, including any waiver of the right to counsel, shall be audio-
recorded or video-recorded in accordance with the procedure provided for in
Rule 43. The Prosecutor shall at the beginning of the questioning caution the
accused in accordance with Rule 42 (A)(iii).
150. Revised Version Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra
note 101, rule 49(A).
151. See generally Salvatore Zappala, The Iraqi Special Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and
Evidence: Neither Fish nor Fowl?, 2 J. CPiM. INT'L JUST. 855 (2004).
152. Iraqi Law No. 23 on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 97, Cj 42.
153. Id. 170. See also id. 'I 213(A) ("The court's its [sic] verdict in a case is based on
the extent to which it is satisfied by the evidence presented during any stage of the
inquiry or the hearing. Evidence includes reports, witness statements, written records
of an interrogation, other official discoveries, reports of experts and technicians and
other legally established evidence.").
154. Revised Version Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra
note 101, rule 62 (describing exculpatory evidence as "evidence known to the Prosecu-
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normal principles of Iraqi law, the trial courts rely on the findings of inves-
tigative judges and the written report as being dispositive on factual mat-
ters; hence the additional overlay of an IST trial process flavored with the
adversarial model could logically lead to longer trials which may or may
not serve the true interests of justice from the societal and personal
perspectives. 155
On the other hand, in preparing for a full trial of the issues, the
defense team benefits from the underlying provisions of Iraqi criminal pro-
cedure law in two major ways. First, the defense team may leverage the
power of the investigative process to generate information or perspective
relevant to the conduct of the defense. The Iraqi criminal procedure code
permits the investigator to appoint, at government expense, one or more
experts on matters "connected to the offense being investigated."'15 6 The
investigative judge may retain an expert "of his own accord or based on the
request of the parties.' 15 7
Secondly, in the preliminary investigation stage of any criminal pro-
ceeding under the Iraqi civil law system, the investigating judge has full
subpoena power to compel the production of relevant evidence. The inves-
tigative judge may "issue an order for the arrest of any witness who fails to
attend in due time for him to be compelled to attend in order to give evi-
dence."'1 5 8 Similarly, the investigating judge has authority to order physi-
cal searches of places or persons. 15 9 The IST rules embody this practice in
that "either party" may request that the investigative judge "make such
orders, summonses, subpoenas and warrants as may be necessary in the
interests of justice."160
3. Prevention of Coercion
Perhaps the most misunderstood and most vital aspect of the IST
structure is the mechanism to prevent the use of any evidence adduced by
torture or other improper techniques. Just as in other war crimes trials,
tor which in any way tends to suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused
or may affect the credibility of a prosecution witness or the authenticity of prosecution
evidence.").
155. Zappala, supra note 151, at 861. For example, unlike the ICTY and ICTR rules,
the IST Rules of Procedure explicitly build in a right of cross-examination for the party
who did not call a witness, even as they permit the judges to "put any question to the
witness." Revised Version Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra
note 101, rule 77.
156. Iraqi Law No. 23 on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 97, 1 69(A).
157. Id.
158. Id. ' 59(C).
159. Id. 9 74 ("If it appears to the examining magistrate that a particular person is
holding items or papers which would inform the investigation, he may issue a written
order for the items to be submitted. If he believes that the order will not be obeyed or is
worried that the items will be removed, he may conduct a search procedure in accor-
dance with the paragraphs below.").
160. Revised Version Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra
note 101, rule 53(A) (this authority also extends to the right of the trial judge or Trial
Chamber to make such orders as "may be necessary for the purposes of the preparation
or conduct of the trial.").
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cases before the IST may rely in part on evidence obtained prior to the time
the defendant or other persons enjoyed a binding right to counsel.' 6 ' Nev-
ertheless, the Trial Chambers of the IST hold the penultimate power to
protect the basic human rights of the accused. Though empowered to
admit relevant evidence based on its probative value alone, the Trial Cham-
ber should consider "[t]he voluntariness of any statement and any circum-
stances that might verify or impugn the statement."'1 62 In particular, the
IST rules come closer to a full blown exclusionary rule than almost any
foreign jurisdiction by requiring the Trial Chamber to consider whether
"the means by which evidence was obtained casts substantial doubt on its
reliability."'16 3
Apart from the specific admonition noted above to the suspect or
accused that any statement may be recorded and used as evidence (which
is acknowledged and signed by both the accused and the investigative
judge), the IST requirements exceed even United States domestic law by
requiring:
Whenever an Investigative Judge questions an accused, the questioning shall
be recorded by audio, video, court reporter or by other means. The accused
shall be informed that the questioning is being recorded. At the conclusion
of the questioning the accused shall be offered the opportunity to clarify
anything he has said, and to add anything he may wish, and the time of
conclusion shall be recorded. The content of the recording shall then be
transcribed (if done by audio or video) as soon as practicable after the con-
clusion of questioning and a copy of the transcript supplied to the
suspect. 16
4
In practice, these recordings and the subsequent transcriptions should
more than suffice to persuade fair-minded observers that the IST trial
processes and ultimate judgments do not derive from coercive techniques.
These IST procedures are also built on a deeper tradition of respect
that is ingrained in Iraqi criminal procedure (though it is fair to assume
that the perception of the world is colored by the willful abuses of these
basic human rights under the Ba'athist regime). For example, at the inves-
tigative stage, a witness "may not be addressed in a declaratory or insinuat-
161. For example, in preparation for the Dachau trials, interrogation teams were sent
to prisoner of war camps across the United States. One of the critical pieces of evidence
against the camp commander of the Dachau camp came from a former German guard
who had been captured in southern France in 1944 and was held at Camp Butler, North
Carolina. JOSHUA M. GREENE, JUSTICE AT DACHAU: THE TRIALS OF AN AMERICAN PROSECU-
TOR 31 (2003).
162. Revised Version Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra
note 101, rule 79(E)(ii).
163. Contra ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, rule 95, available at http://www.
un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm (last visited June 19, 2005) ("No evidence shall be
admissible if obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its
admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceed-
ings."). See generally Craig M. Bradley, Mapp Goes Abroad, 52 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 375,
394 (2001).
164. Revised Version Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra
note 101, rule 47.
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ing manner and no sign or gesture may be directed at him that would tend
to intimidate, confuse or distress him.' 1 6 5 Any public official or agent who
uses torture to extract evidence from "an accused, witness, or informant"
also commits a crime under the Iraqi Criminal Code. 16 6 As a logical exten-
sion of this criminal prohibition, Iraqi procedural law prohibits the "use of
any illegal method to influence the accused and extract a confession."'
1 6 7
Finally, the IST incorporates the underlying norm of Iraqi criminal proce-
dure in that the court can accept a confession only if it has been corrobo-
rated and when "it is satisfied with it."'1 6 8 Similarly, Iraqi law requires that
"it is a condition of the acceptance of the confession that it is not given as a
result of coercion."' 16 9 Those who ignore these established jurisprudential
roots to believe that the IST process will ignore and undermine core human
rights protections betray an unseemly smugness that is unwarranted by
the actual provisions of law and the IST guarantees as they will be imple-
mented in practice.
Conclusion
The Iraqi people almost universally support the concept of prosecut-
ing Saddam and other Ba'athist officials inside Iraq rather than simply
allowing an external tribunal to exercise punitive power.170 They suffered
the injustices and indignities of the Ba'athist regime and have the strongest
stake in the restoration of authentic justice. For the ancient Greeks, the
pursuit of justice symbolized a quest for order and harmony.17 1 Plato con-
ceived of justice as "the highest order of things" on both the personal and
societal level. 17 2 The aspiration for justice embodies the proper balance of
power, wisdom, and temperance which in turn generate societal stability.
In any case, it seems clear that the choice of punishments should be
reserved for sovereign governments answerable to a society in which they
165. Iraqi Law No. 23 on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 97, cl 64.
166. Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 1969, c1 333, reprinted in UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF
PEACE, IRAQI LAWS REFERENCED IN THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL (2004)
(copy on file with author) ("Any public official or agent who tortures or orders the tor-
ture of an accused, witness or informant in order to compel him to confess to the com-
mission of an offence or to make a statement or provide information about such offence
or to withhold information or to give a particular opinion in respect of it is punishable
by imprisonment or by detention. Torture shall include the use of force or menaces.").
167. Iraqi Law No. 23 on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 97, Cl 127 (Mistreatment,
threats, injury, enticement, promises, psychological influence or use of drugs or intoxi-
cants are considered illegal methods.).
168. Id. I 213(C) (CPA Memorandum 3 deleted the additional language "and if there
is no other evidence which proves it to be a lie.").
169. Id. 91 218 (CPA Memorandum 3 modified this provision by deleting the addi-
tional caveats that coercion could include both physical or moral components or even
promises or threats.).
170. Bathsheba Crocker, Iraq: Going it Alone, Gone Wrong, in WINNING THE PEACE: AN
AMERICAN STRATEGY FOR POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION 281 (Robert C. Orr ed., 2004).
171. BRIAN R. NELSON, WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM SOCRATES TO THE AGE OF
IDEOLOGY 31 (1982).
172. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 52-53 (Francis MacDonald Cornford trans. &
ed., 1945).
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live and work rather than the mandarins who minister to the machinery of
international politics. 173 The Iraqis deserve the frontline role in serving
the needs of their own nation, and their families and their culture. They
are best placed to make the difficult decisions over how many of the mil-
lions of possible charges should be investigated and where the proper bal-
ance between justice and vengeance should be struck.1 74 The lawyers and
investigators who have risked their lives and endangered their families by
agreeing to serve their nation on the IST are patriots worthy of our respect
and our assistance.
The formation of the IST as a domestic mechanism created under the
authority of a sovereign Iraqi government culminates the developmental
arc of recent efforts to implement accountability 175 for violations of inter-
national humanitarian law. The IST is closer to the conflict in temporal
terms as well as the available evidence and the victims of the crimes.' 76
The Iraqi people will determine the legitimacy and ultimate effectiveness of
the trials, and they will reap the benefits derived from restoring the rule of
law, just as at the time of this writing they are currently paying a dispro-
portionate share of the costs for the insurgents who continue to murder
civilians. The IST also represents a return to the first principles of interna-
tional criminal law because it is grounded in the fertile soil of state sover-
eignty. In light of the inspiring growth of the field of international criminal
law since World War II, it is often forgotten that the Moscow Declaration
specifically favored punishment through the national courts in the coun-
tries where the crimes were committed "according to the laws of these liber-
ated countries and of the free governments which will be erected
therein.' 77 The military commissions established in the Far East similarly
173. For a detailed account of the Cold War politics and unraveling of wartime unity
that doomed the effort to convene a second International Military Tribunal after World
War 11 to prosecute Major War Criminals, see DONALD BLOXHAM, GENOCIDE ON TRIAL:
WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND THE FORMATION OF HOLOCAUST HISTORY AND MEMORY 28-37
(2001).
174. Allied prosecutors had to sift through the trial dossiers of more than 100,000
potential criminals in deciding who should be prosecuted and in what order. See TEL-
FORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 273 (1992).
As another of the hundreds of examples, the victorious allies excluded the Krupps from
the dock at Nuremberg for political and policy reasons rather than a sober assessment of
how best to serve the needs of German society. BLOXHAM, supra note 173, at 22.
175. Some scholars have made a distinction between the acknowledgement of severe
violations of international norms-whether to remember or forget the abuses-and
accountability for those crimes-or whether to impose sanctions on those who bear per-
sonal responsibility for the abuses. SIMON CHESTERMAN, You, THE PEOPLE: THE UNITED
NATIONS, TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION, AND STATE-BUILDING 157 (2004).
176. Who, it should be remembered, also enjoyed basic human rights that were tram-
pled by the regime.
177. 9 DEP'T ST. BULL. 308, 310, reprinted in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON UNITED
STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIBUNALS 11
(1945). The Moscow Declaration was actually issued to the Press on November 1, 1943.
For an account of the political and legal maneuvering behind the effort to bring this
stated war aim into actuality, see PETER MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR: AN AMERICAN STORY
86-110 (2001). The Declaration specifically stated that German criminals were to be
"sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they
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incorporated the principle that the international forum did not supplant
domestic mechanisms. 178 Even the Secretary-General of the United
Nations Security Council is persuaded that "no rule of law reform, justice
reconstruction, or transitional justice initiative imposed from the outside
can hope to be successful or sustainable."
'1 79
Truth-based trials that conform to the principles of fundamental fair-
ness will be a tangible demonstration that Iraqi society is on the road to a
future built on the values of justice and personal liberty. The IST may not
be a perfect creation, and it will certainly suffer growing pains as it grap-
ples with the incredibly complex and emotionally charged cases that lie
down the road to justice. "Justice" is an intellectual abstraction achieved
only through emotional investment and intellectual struggle. The drafters
of the IST and those patriots who will implement its provisions are all too
aware that willful failure to protect basic human rights could corrode the
very core of the society that they have risked their lives to build. If those
who claim to support the principles of justice and of the rule of law refuse
to help in the name of human rights, they can only do so by turning a blind
eye to the rich jurisprudential roots of the IST. As the Iraqis build a rule of
law for themselves, those who advocate the rule of law should extend their
solidarity rather than seeking to elbow the Iraqis aside and substitute an
artificial view of what they deem best for Iraq.
may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of
the free governments which will be erected therein." The text of the Moscow Declaration
is available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/moscow.htm (last visited June
19, 2005). The international forum was limited only to those offenses where a single
country had no greater grounds for claiming jurisdiction than another country. Justice
Jackson recognized this reality in his famous opening statement. He accepted the fact
that the International Military Tribunal was merely a necessary alternative to domestic
courts for prosecuting the "symbols of fierce nationalism and of militarism." Robert
Jackson, Opening Statement to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, in II
TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 99
(1947). He further clarified that any defendants who succeeded in "escaping the con-
demnation of this Tribunal... will be delivered up to our continental Allies." Id. at 100.
178. See UNITED STATES ARMY PACIFIC, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, REGULATIONS Gov-
ERNING THE TRIAL OF WAR CRIMINALS, AG 000.5, Sept. 24, 1945, 5(b) ("Persons whose
offenses have a particular geographical location outside Japan may be returned to the
scene of their crimes for trial by competent military or civil tribunals of the local juris-
diction.") (copy on file with author).
179. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, 11 17, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616,
(Aug. 23, 2004), available at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/
395/29/pdf/N0439529.pdfOpenElement.

